Dýpkun Kreppu II

Paul McCully hjá Pimco skrifar athyglisverða pistla sem telja má víst að allir lesa sem á annað borð fjalla um hagmál í USA.  McCully segir að hagfræðingar ættu í aðgerðum sínum að hugsa eins og læknar og forðast fyrir alla muni að lækning verði sjúklingnum hættuleg.

McCulley telur að verðbólguskot í skuldsettu hagkerfi sé ákjósanlegra heldur en hrun eignamarkaða.  Ísland er skuldsettasta hagkerfi á meðal OECD ríkja og státar af fjórföldu heimsmeti í viðskiptahalla fjögur ár í röð.

Verðbólga hér á landi er nú svokölluð framleiðsluverðbólga af völdum hrávöruverðshækkana auk leiðréttingar á allt of hátt skráðu gengi.  Allir ættu að geta séð að háir stýrivextir hafa engin áhrif á þessa þætti og því ætti að lækka vexti hér mikið og hratt.

Avoiding a Modern Day Depression
Deflating asset prices in a highly levered economy are a much more nefarious outcome than temporary increases in inflation in goods and services. This is particularly the case from a starting point of low inflation in goods and services (excluding those involved in the negative terms of trade shock). How so? Simple: a negative terms of trade shock and asset price deflation are a prescription for not just a recession, but a nasty one. More to the point, from a starting point of low goods and services inflation, the Fed is never far from the zero lower limit on nominal short-term interest rates, commonly known as a liquidity trap.

Therefore, the more flexible are wages in the face of a negative terms of trade shock, particularly if it coincides with asset price deflation, the greater is the risk of policy makers losing control of the economy on the downside. In turn, this reality argues for the Fed to tolerate higher headline inflation in the wake of a negative terms of trade shock.

To be sure, the Fed must be aware of the dreaded second and third round effects, constantly checking to make sure that real wages and real profits are being eroded by the aberrantly high headline inflation. But, assuming the evidence supports that thesis, as the following graph displays, it would be an absolute folly for the Fed – or any central bank in similar circumstances – to hike interest rates in an attempt to make the negative terms of trade shock go away. By definition, it can't. And if it tries, it will create an even bigger mess. In this case, the motto of a central bank should be the same as that of a physician: first, do no harm. 

Greinina má lesa í heild hér: http://www.pimco.com/LeftNav/Featured+Market+Commentary/FF/2008/Global+Central+Bank+Focus+McCulley+A+Kind+Word+for+Inflation.htm